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SUMMARY 
 
To study the preventive effects of medical malpractice law one needs variation in 
malpractice pressure, across time or space. Since the 1970’s US states have enacted a 
variety of reforms in their tort systems. This variation has provided highly useful data to 
study preventive effects. 
 The empirical evidence shows that medical malpractice risk affects the behavior 
of health care providers. It has a negative impact on the supply of services, and it does 
seem to encourage the ordering of extra diagnostic tests. But the empirical evidence also 
shows that defensive medicine does not have a clear-cut effect on health. If the additional 
tests and procedures have any value, it is only a marginal one. It has further been found 
that changes in the supply of services do not affect health adversely. This suggests that 
the physicians that are driven out of business have a below average quality of 
performance. At the margin, medical liability law may have some social benefits after all. 
 These benefits must be weighed against the costs. Tentative calculations suggest that 
the benefits of even a modest reduction in injury rates suffice to offset reasonable 
estimates of overhead and defensive medicine costs. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Accident losses occur in many ways. People may, for instance, get hurt by a defective 
product, a car crash, an industrial accident, or a medical error. In each of these instances, 
the victim can invoke tort law, trying to obtain damage payments from the injurer. The 
tort system performs three important functions in society. It provides a forum for victims 
to be heard and to oblige injurers to make up for unduly risky behavior (corrective 
justice). It provides compensation for accident losses (distributive justice). And it 
provides incentives for potential injurers to take appropriate care and reduce the number 
of injuries (prevention or deterrence). 
 Economic analysis tends to emphasize the preventive function of tort law. The 
efficiency question is about minimizing the total costs associated with injuries, which 
includes on the one hand the costs of precautionary measures to avoid accident losses, 
and on the other hand the material and immaterial costs of the injuries that nonetheless 
occur. From this perspective, law and economics scholarship over the past 40 years has 
greatly enhanced our understanding of tort law.1 
 But of course, theoretical analysis can not give a definite answer as to the 
performance of tort law in the real world.2 Tort law may be rendered superfluous by other 
incentives to avoid accident losses. These include: moral principles, concern for the 
injurers’ own safety, market forces driving out unsafe products, and regulatory 
government programs directed at safety goals. Tort law may also turn out to be futile in 
its efforts for various reasons. Negligent conduct can be inadvertent. Liability insurance 
may reduce the incentive effects of the liability threat. And typical features of tort 
litigation, such as legal costs and uncertain verdicts, may withhold victims from filing a 
claim or induce them to accept a settlement that does not cover all losses. 
 Exactly how much deterrence tort law provides is ultimately an empirical question. 
However, it is not so easy to find the answer. For one thing, reliable data on the number 
of accidents, the frequency and severity of injuries, the level of care, and the costs of 
prevention are in general not readily available. Apart from data, one also needs variation 
in the tort rules, across time or space, for it is the differential impact that yields 
information on the effects of the rules. But to reliably compare outcomes across time or 
space, other social, economic and technological developments that might be responsible 
for the differences must be controlled for. For instance, one has to ascertain that the 
substantive effects of tort law can be distinguished from the effects which may be due to 
the process of litigation, the organization and regulation of the insurance industry, the 
remuneration structure of the health care sector, and governmental safety policies. A final 
remark relates to the fact that decisions on tort reform are not made within a political void. 
They are influenced by lobbying efforts from special interest groups. As a consequence, 
the relationship between tort law and the frequency and severity of accidents in society 
may well be bi-directional, and difficult to disentangle. 
 In this paper we study the preventive effects of tort law by focusing on medical 
malpractice law.3 Concentrating on this specific field of tort law has some important 
advantages. Medical errors are mostly one-sided, in the sense that only physicians can 
                                                 
1
  Shavell 2004. 
2
  Schwartz 1994. 
3
  Other fields of tort law are discussed by Dewees et al. 1996 and Van Velthoven 2009. 
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take more or less care, not the patients. This one-sidedness makes the interpretation of 
empirical results more straightforward. Moreover, medical malpractice law has been 
studied extensively. In order to study the preventive effects of medical liability, one 
needs variation in malpractice law. Since the 1970’s, the US has experienced three 
medical malpractice crisis, periods characterized by significant increases in the premiums 
and contractions in the supply of malpractice insurance. In response to these crises, US 
states have enacted a variety of reforms in their tort systems. As a result of all this, the 
US has seen a considerable variation, across time and space, in the pressure of the 
medical liability system on health care providers. This variation has provided highly 
useful data to study the preventive effects of tort law. Which is not to say that there is no 
relevant empirical material on other countries at all. But that material is rather sparse and 
does not allow us to sketch the full picture.4 
 The article is organized in the following way. In Section 2 we present the standard 
tort model from the law and economics theory and apply it to medical malpractice. Then 
we turn to empirics, concentrating on the US for the reasons just set out. In Section 3 we 
discuss the actual working of the US tort litigation system. How many victims of a 
medical error file a claim? And do they obtain adequate compensation? Section 4 
addresses the key characteristics of medical liability insurance. It also gives an overview 
of the tort reform measures in response to the successive malpractice crises. Section 5 
presents the main findings with respect to the preventive function of tort law. Does 
medical malpractice law provide adequate incentives for health care professionals to take 
appropriate care? Section 6 concludes. 
 One caveat is in order. Because of the availability of sufficient relevant data, findings 
on the preventive effects of medical liability primarily regard the US. The influence of 
liability can be expected to depend on the institutional context, which may vary in terms 
of medical liability insurance, hospital management and health care remuneration 
schemes, government regulation of quality and safety standards, and the disciplinary 
rules of the medical profession itself. Empirical studies for the US try to control for the 
variation in the institutional context across time and between states, to isolate the 
influence of liability. Thus, the findings may also be relevant in other settings. But, of 
course, when applying the results to other countries, the specific institutional context 
should be carefully taken into account. 
 
 
2 Theory 
 
In the economic analysis of tort law, a fundamental distinction is made between unilateral 
and bilateral accidents. In a unilateral case only one party to the accident, the potential 
injurer, can take precautionary measures to reduce the probability and/or severity of harm. 
The potential victim just can not help suffering damages. In a bilateral accident case both 
                                                 
4
 For countries outside the US, there is a considerable literature that discusses the frequency of medical 
injuries as a result of negligent care, the number of incidents that have been reported, and the handling of 
malpractice claims by the medical liability insurance sector for countries. See for the Netherlands, e.g., 
Zegers et al. (2009), Christiaans-Dingelhoff et al. (2011), Verkruisen (1993) and Van Velthoven (2008). 
But there is no relevant empirical material with respect to the preventive effects of malpractice pressure on 
the quality and quantity of care provided by health care professionals. 
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parties can take care in order to reduce the accident risk. 
 Medical injuries can generally be taken to be unilateral accidents. A physician who 
wants to reduce the probability and severity of medical injury can increase the number of 
visits provided to his patient, perform additional diagnostic tests, refer the patient to a 
specialist, opt for more or less invasive procedures, and/or take more care in performing 
surgery, The patient is usually unable to influence expected harm from a medical injury.5 
 When the physician’s behavior has actually caused harm to the victim, medical 
malpractice law quite universally holds the injurer liable for accident losses that are 
attributable to negligence. That is, the victim can only obtain damages if the injurer’s 
level of care has stayed behind the minimum level required by law. 
 For that reason we focus on the economic analysis of the negligence rule in case of 
unilateral accidents. We first give a general presentation of the standard tort model. Then 
we discuss the various problems if that model is applied to medical malpractice. This will 
help us to set the frequently used concept of defensive medicine in the proper perspective. 
 
2.1 The standard tort model6 
 
The efficient level of care 
Figure 1 sets the stage for a unilateral accident case, with the (potential) injurer’s level of 
care on the horizontal axis and the relevant costs on the vertical axis. Two different kinds 
of costs are distinguished. As the injurer raises the level of care by taking additional 
precautionary measures, his costs of care increase. But at the same time there is a 
reduction in the expected harm for the (potential) victim, as additional care may reduce 
the probability of an accident and/or the severity of accident losses. 
 
 
                                                 
5
 There are some exceptions of course, as a patient can more or less faithfully adhere to the medication, 
the life style rules and the physiotherapy prescribed by his physician. 
6
  Miceli 2004, p.42-45. For a more general discussion of the economic theory of tort law, including 
bilateral accidents and the strict liability rule, see Shavell 2004. 
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From the point of view of society both kinds of costs are relevant, as they both use up 
scarce resources. The sum of the costs of care and the expected harm is given by the 
expected total costs curve. The social optimum is obtained if the expected total costs are 
at a minimum. The socially optimal level of precaution is frequently referred to as the 
efficient level of care. 
 
The norm of due care 
What level of care the injurer actually chooses depends on his personal incentives. These 
personal incentives do not necessarily lead him to the socially optimal level of care. It is 
here that the liability rule enters the picture. 
 The negligence rule presupposes a behavioral norm, specified by statutory law or 
jurisprudence, for the precautionary measures that the injurer should take at a minimum. 
This is called the norm of due care. If the injurer’s level of care falls short of this 
minimum, the injurer is said to be negligent and will be held liable for accident losses. On 
the other hand, if the injurer’s level of care equals or exceeds the due care norm, he will 
not be held liable. 
 The injurer’s expected costs depend on his choice of the level of care. If the injurer 
exercises less than due care, his expected costs are equal to the sum of his own costs of 
care and the expected damages he has pay to the victim. However, if he exercises at least 
due care he only has to bear the costs of care. As he is not liable for any harm, accident 
losses will remain with the victim. 
 Figure 2 shows the working of the negligence rule. The negligence rule creates a 
discontinuity in the injurer’s expected costs at the level of due care, as shown by the fat 
curve. The injurer minimizes his costs by just taking precautionary measures in 
conformity with the due care norm. 
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It then all depends on the proper choice of the due care norm, whether the injurer will act 
in a socially optimal manner. The injurer will take socially optimal precautions if, as in 
Figure 2, the level of due care specified by law coincides with the efficient level of care. 
If the due care norm is set below (above) the efficient level of care, the personal 
incentives will generally lead the injurer to behave in a suboptimal manner by taking too 
little (too much) precaution. 
 
Observations 
For a good understanding of the standard tort model we want to make three remarks. 
 First, it is important to note that it is generally not efficient to set due care at a level 
that induces maximum precaution. Because precaution is costly, it is not in society's 
interest to require injurers to take every available measure to eliminate even the slimmest 
of accident losses. Society is better off only as long as the marginal benefit from 
additional precaution (less expected harm) exceed the marginal costs (more costs of 
care).7 
 Second, at the efficient level of care the marginal benefit from additional precaution 
will generally be positive. More care will further reduce expected harm, but this 
reduction of harm just does not make up for the additional costs. 
 Third, if the injurer conforms to the due care norm as prescribed by law, he will not 
be held liable for any accident losses. As illustrated in figure 2 a non-negligent injurer 
only has to bear the costs of care. Consequently, a non-negligent injurer is not confronted 
with the full social costs of his activity.8 This may lead the injurer to undertake too many 
activities from a social point of view. 
 
2.2 The standard tort model applied to medical malpractice 
As noted before, medical injuries can generally be taken to be unilateral accidents. 
Moreover, medical malpractice law generally follows the negligence rule. That makes it 
tempting to apply the standard tort model set out in Figure 2. We then might infer that 
medical malpractice law can induce physicians to take efficient care. Setting the due care 
norm at the efficient level of care just would do the trick. 
 This would, however, be jumping to conclusions. In practice, a number of specific 
characteristics of medical care and medical malpractice litigation pose serious problems 
to a straightforward application of the standard tort model. We shall discuss these 
problems one by one. 
 
Uncertainty about due care 
The standard tort model suggests that injurers can be induced to provide socially optimal 
care, if law sets due care at the efficient level. This simple rule, however, is not easily 
met in the health care sector, for the following reasons: 
- It is rather difficult to determine the efficient level of care with a reasonable degree of 
certainty, even for specialists in the field. Hence, it is generally impossible for law to 
set the due care norm precisely right. Instead, the courts evaluate the conduct of 
physicians almost exclusively in terms of customary standards of practice within the 
                                                 
7
  In terms of Figure 2: as long as the slope of the expected harm curve is steeper than the slope of the 
costs of care curve. At the efficient level of care these slopes are equal. 
8
  In the terminology of economics: his behavior has a negative external effect. 
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medical profession.9 
- Physicians on their part are no legal experts. They generally have no exact insight 
into the due care norm that will be applied by the courts when confronted with a 
claim. 
- When it comes to court proceedings, the judge has to decide whether in the specific 
case the physician has been careful enough. Even if the due care norm is right, the 
judge may err in his decision, as the information presented to the court will generally 
be incomplete and subject to mistakes in interpretation. Consequently, physicians do 
not know exactly how careful they have to be in order to escape liability. 
Calfee & Craswell (1984) have studied the consequences. If there is uncertainty about the 
due care norm and its application in court, there is a chance that a physician who has 
taken sufficient care may still be held liable for damages. The physician can try to reduce 
that chance by overcomplying, that is, by raising his level of care beyond due care. The 
increase in his costs of care may well be outweighed by the reduction in his expected 
damage payments. 
 
Who bears the costs of care? 
The standard tort model starts from the premise that the costs of care are borne by the 
injurer. This is, however, not self-evident in the health care sector, as physicians are 
generally paid on a fee-for-service basis. Moreover, most patients carry a health 
insurance policy. When a physician decides to raise the level of care, by increasing the 
number of visits, performing additional tests, or carrying out a more invasive procedure, 
he will not have much trouble in charging the additional costs to his patient, who will 
forward the bill to his insurance company. The patient in general will not refuse the extra 
care, as the physician can readily explain that it will have a positive effect on his health.10 
 If it would be true that the physician can pass on any additional care costs, it is easily 
seen from Figure 2 that he will be tempted to choose a level of care well above the due 
care norm. For one thing, it isolates him from any uncertainty about the court’s 
interpretation of due care. Moreover, not providing potentially beneficial care tends to go 
against the ethics of his medical profession. 
 The financial incentive to provide too much care will of course be mitigated if health 
care services are financed in a different way, that hinders or prevents the passing on of 
additional care costs. One can think of: pure salary payment, capitation payment, or 
managed care plans.11 
 
Litigation problems 
The standard tort model takes it for granted that the injurer pays damages, once he is 
found to have exercised less than due care. In general, however, this payment will not be 
made spontaneously. The injurer will wait until the victim takes action. This means, first, 
that the victim has to decide whether it is in his interest to file a claim. Maybe the patient 
is not aware of the negligence of his physician, maybe it is too uncertain what the judge 
will decide, maybe the litigation costs are too high, maybe the financial means of the 
                                                 
9
  Weiler et al. 1993, p.8. 
10
  Cf. the second observation at the end of Section 2.1. That the positive health effect may be small in 
relation to the costs is another matter. 
11
  Glied 2000. 
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victim are insufficient. Second, even if a claim is filed, parties may decide to settle the 
case in the shadow of the law, in order to save on litigation costs. The patient will have a 
subjective probability to prevail in court, but this probability will in general not be equal 
to 100%. Moreover, this subjective probability presumably will not match the subjective 
probability of the physician. Economic analysis of litigation suggests that a dispute may 
only result in a trial if the parties’ subjective probabilities of prevailing add up to more 
than 100%.12 If the case is settled, damages will not amount to a full compensation. 
 The implication of all this is that the injurer can safely reckon with average damage 
payments on his account that fall short of the expected harm of his behavior. This will 
clearly dampen the injurer’s incentive to conform to the due care norm required by law. 
The result is a tendency towards insufficient care. 
 
Liability insurance 
The incentive effect is further diminished, if the physician carries insurance against the 
financial consequences of malpractice. The insurance policy shifts the burden of the 
damages the injurer eventually has to pay to the insurer. Medical malpractice insurance 
thus lowers the injurer’s costs of insufficient care. 
 In theory, experience rating can redress this tendency. Experience rating refers to a 
variety of schemes that see to it that liability insurance premiums more or less accurately 
reflect each insured’s expected loss.13 This is mostly done by varying premiums with past 
claims or loss experience. Shavell (1982) has shown that insurance need not interfere 
with the incentive effects of liability if premiums are perfectly experience rated. But 
experience rating is more easily said than done in the case of medical care. Medical 
malpractice claims occur too infrequently to give insurance companies enough 
information to reliably set premiums in accordance with individual physician’s care 
levels. 
 Medical malpractice insurance, however, does not completely eliminate incentives to 
take care. Malpractice may affect the physician severely, even if he is fully insured 
against the direct financial consequences of legal assistance and damages. For claims also 
bring along other kinds of costs. The defense may take quite a lot of his precious time, 
the experience is rather unpleasant, and it may cause serious reputational harm.14 
 
Conclusion 
The preceding analysis has shown that the negligence rule in medical malpractice law 
does not necessarily lead to a socially optimal level of precaution, not even if the due care 
norm is set equal to the efficient level of care. The incentives are distorted. For one thing, 
physicians generally do not bear the full accident losses of insufficient care, as a result of 
problems in the litigation process and the omnipresence of medical liability insurance. 
This distortion may act as an invitation to physicians to take less care than legally 
required. Still, the nonfinancial consequences of liability (time, hassle, reputation loss) 
may provide some counterweight. Other distortions provide incentives to act on the safe 
side of the due care norm. Physicians generally do not bear the (full) costs of care due to 
specific methods of financing in the health care sector. And there is uncertainty about the 
                                                 
12
  Miceli 2004, p.245-248. 
13
  Danzon 2000, p.1160. 
14
  Weiler et al. 1993, p.126. 
 9
due care norm and its application by the courts. On balance, there might be a bias towards 
excessive care. 
 
2.3 Defensive medicine 
In an ideal world, medical liability would put just so much pressure on physicians that 
they would take the efficient level of care. In reality, especially in the US, the conviction 
has taken root among physicians and their liability insurers that the malpractice system 
has gone too far. It is argued that the pressure has evolved to such a level, that it has 
given rise to defensive medicine. The most common definition15 reads: “Defensive 
medicine occurs when doctors order tests, procedures, or visits, or avoid high-risk 
patients or procedures, primarily (but not necessarily solely) to reduce their exposure to 
malpractice liability.” According to this definition, defensive medicine can take two 
forms. Positive defensive medicine involves supplying care that is not cost effective, 
unproductive, or even harmful. Negative defensive medicine involves declining patients 
that might benefit from care. It also includes physicians deciding to exit the profession 
altogether. 
 
However straightforward the concept of positive defensive medicine may look at first 
sight, it is not immediately clear from the standard tort model that this kind of defensive 
medicine may actually apply. On theoretical grounds it has been deduced above that 
malpractice pressure on the physicians’ choice of care level is working in two directions. 
On balance, there might be a bias towards excessive care. Thus, the question whether 
physicians supply too much care is really an empirical question. 
 Second, if malpractice pressure does produce a bias towards excessive care, it is 
excessive in comparison to the due care norm. However, there is in general no guarantee 
that the due care norm has been set equal by law to the efficient level of care. That leaves 
the possibility, even if empirical research finds proof of excessive care, that that level of 
care still falls short of the socially optimal amount.16 
 
The concept of negative defensive medicine is related to the level of activities, referred to 
at the end of Section 2.1. If a physician takes at least due care, he will not be liable for 
any accident losses. He does not bear the full costs of the patients’ treatment, which gives 
him the incentive to accept too many patients from a social point of view and/or or to stay 
too long in the profession. However, the simple fear of malpractice claims, even if 
unwarranted, and the corresponding threat of time and reputation loss may work in the 
opposite direction. This malpractice liability risk might induce him to reject patients or to 
relocate his activities. On balance, there might be negative defensive medicine in the 
sense defined above. 
 But note that things change, if the physician exercises insufficient care. Then, 
malpractice law can help patients to file claims and to obtain damage payments. And this 
gives the negligent physician a good reason to revise his conduct, not only by raising his 
level of care, but also by accepting fewer patients or by early retiring. Such a behavioral 
response would be very welcome from the point of view of society. 
 
                                                 
15
  OTA 1994, p.21. 
16
  Sloan & Shadle 2009, p.481. 
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3 The tort litigation system 
 
This section surveys the empirical evidence concerning medical liability litigation. To 
what degree are injurers actually confronted with the accident losses they bring about by 
their behavior? Let us take a look at the different layers of the dispute pyramid.17 
 Three large-scale surveys of medical records of hospitalized patients in the US have 
investigated the incidence of injury due to medical care and the subset caused by 
negligence. The most recent study was done in Utah and Colorado in 1992.18 It was 
found that 2.9% of the patients had an adverse event that was related to medical care, of 
which 29% involved a negligent act or omission. Thus, some 0.8% of all hospitalized 
patients suffered a negligent injury. A negligent injury was defined as the consequence of 
treatment that failed to meet the standard of the average medical practitioner. No attempt 
was made to define negligence by weighing marginal costs and benefits of additional 
precautions. So, the resulting count of negligent injuries does not necessarily correspond 
to economically inefficient injuries. 
 The second layer of the dispute pyramid discloses how many of the injury victims 
take steps to obtain compensation. In the Utah and Colorado study, only 3% of the 
patients who were identified as having sustained a negligent injury filed a malpractice 
claim. Thus, claims lag well behind the incidence of negligent injury. But there is also a 
significant number of ‘false positives’ among medical malpractice claims. Aggregate data 
from insurers’ records pointed out that a substantial number of malpractice claims do not 
correspond to an identifiable injury due to negligent medical behavior. Of course, all 
these plaintiffs may still have filed the claims in good faith, from a state of imperfect 
information, leaving it to the tort system to separate the rightful claims from the non-
deserving ones. 
 The third layer of the dispute pyramid discloses how filed claims fare in the tort 
system. Studdert et al. (2006) analyzed a large sample of malpractice claims closed 
between 1984 and 2004. In this sample, 61% of claims could be associated with injury 
due to medical error, while 39% of the claims had no merit. Only 15% of all the claims 
were resolved by trial verdict, the rest was settled in the ‘shadow of the law’ or dropped. 
Most of the claims involving injuries due to medical error (73%) received compensation, 
most claims not involving medical error (72%) did not receive compensation. Moreover, 
when claims involving error were compensated, payments were significantly higher on 
average than were payments for non-error claims. 
 With respect to the payment amounts two observations are in place. First, 
compensation in most cases falls short of plaintiff’s losses, especially for more serious 
injuries.19 Second, the costs of administering the tort system are considerable. At the US 
national level, total administrative costs (legal expenses of plaintiffs and defendants, 
overhead costs of insurers and hospitals) are estimated to be $4.1 billion, against net 
indemnity payments of $5.7 billion.20 Apparently, it costs society overall more than $1.70 
to deliver $1 of net compensation. 
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  Van Velthoven 2009 gives more details and references. 
18
  Studdert et al. 2000. 
19
  Sloan & Chepke 2008. 
20
  Mello et al. (2010). 
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 The tort litigation system is not perfect, then. It sometimes makes physicians - or their 
insurers - pay damages for non-negligent care. But the system is clearly not a random 
lottery. It can be calculated from the figures cited above that negligent injuries are at least 
ten times as likely to end up in compensatory payments as non-negligent injuries. More 
disturbing for the proper working of the system seems to be the high rate of ‘false 
negatives’. For the figures above suggest that just some 2% of the patients with negligent 
injuries gets compensation, mainly because a large fraction of valid claims is not filed, 
but to a lesser degree also because not all valid claims that are filed get honored. 
Combining that result with the finding that compensation generally falls short of victims’ 
losses suggests that the deterrent function of the system tends to be rather limited. 
 
 
4 Medical liability insurance and tort reform 
 
The previous section gave an overview of the operational behavior of the tort litigation 
system. Two highly related issues were left aside: medical liability insurance and tort 
reform. We now give some details. 
 
4.1 Medical liability insurance 
Physicians generally carry a malpractice insurance policy.21 Conventional wisdom holds 
that the most common policies sold by insurers provide $1 million of coverage per 
incident and $3 million of total coverage per year. But that coverage may be exaggerated. 
Zeiler et al. (2007) found for Texas that physicians with paid claims in 2003 carried 
policies with a median limit of $500,000 per incident only. 
 Medical malpractice premiums differ widely.22 Premiums paid by traditional high-
risk specialties, such as obstetrics and surgery, are usually higher than premiums paid by 
other specialties. Premium rates also vary geographically across and within states. 
However, there is no experience rating of premiums at the level of the individual 
physician. Nor are deductibles or other co-payments used on a regular basis. 
 For hospitals, the situation is somewhat different. After the first tort crisis in the mid 
1970s, many hospitals found it difficult to obtain insurance and turned to self-insurance 
or to mutual companies with at least some experience rating. 
 
Calculations by Jena et al. (2011) point out that each year nationwide 7.4% of all 
physicians are confronted with a malpractice claim, with only 1.6% having a claim 
leading to a payment. There is a great variation in claim rates across specialties, ranging 
from 2.6% to 19.1%, and in average indemnity payments, ranging from $117,000 to 
$521,000. 
 The financial costs related to these claims (indemnity payments, defense costs) are in 
general more or less fully covered by the insurance policies.23 In only 1 or 2% of all cases 
do physicians use their own personal assets to resolve claims, with a median of some 
$50.000. 
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  GAO 2003, p.6. 
22
  Danzon 2000. 
23
  Weiler et al. 1993, Zeiler et al. 2007. 
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4.2 Malpractice crises and tort reform 
In the past decades, the US have experienced three ‘crises’ in the malpractice insurance 
market. These were periods of deterioration in the financial health of carriers, followed 
by sharp increases in premiums and contractions in supply. The first crisis occurred in the 
mid 1970s and remained confined to a number of states. The next ones in the mid 1980s 
and the first years of the new millennium were much more general. Although this is not 
the place to delve deeply in the causes of these crises,24 one factor should be singled out: 
the ‘long tail’ character of this line of insurance. Claims may be filed many years after an 
adverse event causes injury. And from there it may take many more years before the 
insurance company finally knows how much compensation it has to pay. If, for whatever 
reason, there is a gradual rise in claim frequency and/or in average payments, for instance 
because of pro-plaintiff adaptations in common law doctrines or because patients are 
becoming more assertive towards health care professionals, insurance companies will 
tend to lag behind. They will develop unexpected losses, and overreact in raising 
premiums and curtailing supply. 
 In response to the malpractice crises most US states have adopted tort reform 
measures. The objective of these measures is to reduce the overall costs of medical 
liability. The extent and specifics of tort reform vary from state to state.25 Some reforms 
make it more costly or difficult to file tort cases, other reforms aim at a reduction of 
damage awards. The following list gives an overview of the tort reforms most commonly 
adopted:26 
- shorter statutes of limitation: limit the amount of time a patient has to file a 
malpractice claim after the occurrence or discovery of the injury. 
- contingency fee reform: limits the amount of a damage award that a plaintiff’s 
attorney may take in a contingent fee arrangement. 
- pretrial screening panels: review a malpractice case at an early stage and assess 
whether a claim has sufficient merit to proceed to trial. 
- caps on damages: limit the amount of money that a plaintiff can take as an award. 
The cap may apply to noneconomic damages (pain and suffering), total damages, or 
only punitive damages. 
- joint-and-several liability reform: limits the financial liability of each individual, in 
cases involving more than one defendant, to the percentage fault of the individual. 
- collateral source rule reform: eliminates the traditional rule that any compensation a 
plaintiff receives from other sources, such as health insurance, should not be deducted 
from the damage award. 
- periodic payment: allows or requires insurers to pay out malpractice awards over a 
longer period of time, rather than in a lump sum. 
 
The effects of these tort reforms on the frequency and the size of claims and on 
malpractice insurance premiums have been studied extensively. A detailed review by 
Mello (2006) concludes that there is no convincing evidence that the reforms have had 
any significant impact on claims frequency. The evidence with respect to average damage 
payments and insurance premiums is somewhat more favorable. But here, only one 
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reform measure really stands out. Caps on (noneconomic) damages have a significant 
effect on average damage payments, typically on the order of a 20 to 30% reduction. 
Damage caps also help to constrain the growth of premiums over time. This specific kind 
of tort reform apparently can help, if so desired, to relieve malpractice pressure. 
 
 
5 Preventive effects of tort law 
 
It is an empirical question whether tort law leads physicians to take appropriate 
precautions or to engage in defensive medicine. In the literature three main research lines 
can be distinguished. The first line of research surveys physicians and asks their opinion 
on the role of malpractice pressure in clinical practice. The second line is about the actual 
relevance of positive defensive medicine. How do treatment choices by physicians, and 
the health outcomes of their patients, respond to malpractice pressure? The third line is 
on negative defensive medicine and analyzes how malpractice pressure affects the supply 
of health care services. 
 
5.1 Survey studies 
Survey studies among physicians unequivocally point out that concerns about malpractice 
liability are pervasive among physicians.27 Carrier et al. (2010) report, for instance, that 
78% of physicians agree with the statement that it is becoming increasingly risky to rely 
on clinical judgment rather than diagnostic testing because of the threat of malpractice 
suits. Indeed, physicians report significant changes in their clinical practice in response to 
the perceived malpractice threat. They order more tests and procedures, take more time in 
explaining risks, reduce the number of patients, restrict the scope of their practice. Most 
common is ‘assurance behavior’: ordering more diagnostic tests and referring patients to 
other specialists. 
 Thus, these survey results point to an overall presence of defensive medicine. Yet, 
they should not be adopted without caution. First, the relationship between perceived 
malpractice threat and objective liability risk is found to be very modest. Physicians 
systematically overestimate the risk that malpractice action will be brought against 
them.28 Second, the relationship between malpractice threat and clinical response is a 
self-reported one. 
 It remains to be seen whether the impact of medical liability is borne out by figures 
on actual medical decisions, controlling for other relevant factors, and whether the impact 
should be evaluated as defensive medicine or rather as a real contribution to health care 
quality. 
 
5.2 Positive defensive medicine 
The second line of the empirical literature concerns the impact of (changes in) tort law on 
the physicians’ level of care and on the frequency and severity of injuries. 
 
Much attention has gone to obstetrics, the field that has one of the highest levels of 
premiums, claim frequency and damage payments. Typically, studies examine the impact 
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  Weiler et al. 1993, Studdert et al. 2005, Mello et al. 2005, Carrier et al. 2010. 
28
  Weiler et al. 1993, Carrier et al. 2010. 
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of tort law on cesarean section rates. Cesarean sections are a treatment thought to be more 
frequently adopted in risky situations under the influence of malpractice pressure. 
Malpractice pressure is measured in various ways: through mean liability premiums, 
mean perceived liability risk, mean number of claims, mean amount of damage payments, 
personal claim experience, or the presence yes/no of tort reform measures. Older studies 
mostly have samples of births and/or obstetricians from one state at one specific point in 
time. The effects of tort law are derived from variation between physicians or between 
countries in malpractice pressure on the one hand and cesarean section rates on the other 
hand. More recent studies use panel data for US states. The studies of course try to 
control for a variety of other relevant factors, such as medical risk of mother and child, 
characteristics of physician and hospital, and demographic and socio-economic factors of 
the state. 
 Several authors do find empirical evidence that higher malpractice pressure raises the 
probability of delivery by cesarean section.29 Other authors, however, report the opposite 
effect30 or find no effect at all.31 Dranove & Watanabe (2010) go into some detail. They 
observe an increase in an obstetrician’s cesarean section rate after a claim has been 
brought against him, but this effect is short-lived and limited to the first claim. This 
suggests that obstetricians overreact to their first claim, and rapidly discover that the 
litigation process is neither costly nor particularly painful. 
 Some studies have also looked at the impact on infant health at birth. Sloan et al. 
(1995) Dubay et al. (1999) and Yang et al. (2012) could not find a significant effect of 
malpractice pressure, while the results by Currie & McLeod (2008) on caps on 
noneconomic damages are mixed. 
 Overall, then, the results are inconclusive. There is no decisive evidence for positive 
defensive medicine in obstetrics. 
 
Kessler & McClellan (1996, 2002a,b) focus on a rather different field of medicine, 
cardiac illness. Their findings indicate that tort reform measures that directly limit 
liability, such as caps on damage awards, reduce hospital expenditures by 5-9 percent. 
Reforms, on the other hand, do not lead to any consequential differences in mortality or 
the occurrence of serious complications. This suggests that a reduction of malpractice 
pressure clears the way for physicians to save on tests and procedures, without any 
negative effect for the patients. Apparently, the tests and procedures in question were 
essentially needless, and thus a form of positive defensive medicine. 
 It is also interesting to note that the reduction in defensive practices achieved through 
direct tort reform tends to be smaller in areas with high managed care enrollment. 
Managed care seems to reduce physicians’ incentives and ability to engage in defensive 
treatment. In that sense, tort reform and managed care are substitutes. 
 The results by Kessler & McClellan, however, have not gone uncontested. In a study 
by Dhankhar et al. (2007), higher medical malpractice risk leads to a choice of procedure 
that is less invasive for heart patients, and cost saving too. Interestingly enough, health 
outcomes of patients improve. Thus, malpractice law would seem to induce physicians to 
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provide better suited and more efficient care. 
 
Still other studies take a look at broader sets of ailments or total health care expenditures. 
The results are mixed. Some authors find no evidence that direct tort reforms reduce 
medical spending.32 Other studies confirm the results by Kessler & McClellan. That is, 
malpractice pressure does seem to lead to positive defensive medicine.33 That conclusion 
should, however, be read with an important reservation. As far as physicians are found to 
practice positive defensive medicine, the excessive care appears to be related to rather 
elementary diagnostic tests such as imaging, not to major surgical procedures.34 The 
overall picture is that the total effect on health care costs, if any, is rather small.35 
 
5.3 Negative defensive medicine 
The third line of empirical research examines how the medical malpractice crises of the 
past decades have affected the supply of health care services. 
 The results with respect to obstetrics are mixed. Rosenblatt & Wright (1987) report 
that general practitioners and family doctors tended to decrease or stop their obstetric 
practice because of professional liability issues, while Dubay et al. (2001) find that 
malpractice pressure resulted in prenatal care beginning later in the pregnancy. Dranove 
& Gron (2005) and Yang et al. (2008), on the other hand, do not find a relationship. 
 Other studies analyze the overall supply of physician services.36 All results point in 
the same direction. Higher malpractice pressure tends to diminish health care supply, be 
it the number of physicians, statewide or in local areas only, or their hours worked. That 
finding seems to be definite proof of negative defensive medicine. But note that the 
interpretation is not so obvious. A smaller supply of physicians in itself can be presumed 
to contribute negatively to social welfare, but there may also be offsetting effects if the 
quality of the physicians that stop or reduce their practice is below average.37 Indeed, 
Dubay et al. (2001) and Klick & Stratmann (2007) find no evidence that the changes in 
supply had negative health effects. 
 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have looked at the preventive effects of medical malpractice law. Our 
starting point was the standard model as presented in the law and economics literature. In 
principle, the negligence rule may induce physicians to take efficient care. In practice, a 
number of factors distort the incentives provided by the negligence rule: uncertainty 
about the due care norm, the remuneration structure of health care services, problems in 
the process of litigation, and medical liability insurance. Also, non-financial 
consequences of liability claims may affect the behavior of physicians. 
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 Because these factors work in opposite directions, the effect of medical malpractice 
law is ultimately an empirical question. To single out the effect, one needs variation in 
medical malpractice pressure, across time or space. That variation is provided by US data. 
In the literature three lines of research can be distinguished. First, survey research 
indicates that physicians are inclined towards defensive medicine. Second, findings on 
the effect of malpractice pressure on the actual level of care are mixed. If indeed 
physicians are providing excessive care, it seems to refer to elementary diagnostic tests, 
not to major surgical procedures. Third, as malpractice liability risks go up, health care 
supply tends to shrink. 
 Thus, medical malpractice risk is found to affect the behavior of health care providers. 
It has a negative impact on the supply of services, and it does seem to encourage the 
ordering of extra diagnostic tests. But that still leaves two important questions. First, what 
is the net impact on health? And second, how is the balance of costs and benefits? 
 The empirical evidence shows that positive defensive medicine does not have a clear-
cut effect on health. If the additional tests and procedures have any value, it is only a 
marginal one. It has further been found that changes in the supply of services do not 
affect health adversely. This suggests that the physicians that are driven out of business 
have a below average quality of performance. At the margin, medical liability law may 
have some social benefits after all. 
 These benefits must be weighed against the costs of the additional tests and 
procedures. The costs of administering malpractice claims also deserve attention. For it 
takes society overall more than $1.70 to deliver $1 of net compensation. Both Danzon 
(2000) and Lakdawalla & Seabury (2009) have made a shot at a back-of-the-envelope 
calculation of the costs and benefits. They conclude that under quite general assumptions 
the benefits of even a modest reduction in injury rates suffice to offset reasonable 
estimates of overhead and defensive medicine costs. This follows from the large social 
costs of medical injuries and the low rate of claims per negligent injury. 
 Yet, instructive as these calculations may be, they mainly have a heuristic value. First, 
a full cost-benefit evaluation of the medical liability system is impossible in the current 
state of affairs. Second, even if the marginal benefits of the current system do outweigh 
the costs, the search for improvements and alternatives is open.38 But that is a topic for 
another article. 
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